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BLD-070        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-3767 
____________ 
 
IN RE: WILLIAM L. BURRELL, JR., 
      Petitioner 
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-01891)  
__________________________________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
December 3, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 17, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner William L. Burrell petitions for a writ of mandamus.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will deny the petition. 
 In his mandamus petition, Burrell contends that he is the victim of a “Trash for 
Cash” scheme, in which two notorious businessmen from the Bufalino crime family 
compelled the Lackawanna County judges “to misuse Pennsylvania’s child support 
statute and give illegal sentences to child support obligors, purposely giving them purge 
conditions” they could not meet.  Petition, at 1.  Specifically, Burrell contends that,  
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
because he could not make his child support payment, he was forced to work in those 
businessmen’s trash factory for just $5.00 per day, in order to be released early from 
prison.  Id. at 1-2.  Burrell notes that he filed an in forma pauperis civil action in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, see Burrell v. 
Loungo, D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-01891, complaining about this issue.  In his civil action, he 
contended that there is a conspiracy in Lackawanna County involving the Domestic 
Relations Section of the Court of Common Pleas, the county’s prison, and the county’s 
recycling center.  As part of this alleged conspiracy, individuals like Burrell who fail to 
comply with child support orders are detained and then forced to work in the trash 
factory/recycling center in deplorable conditions for only $5 per day.  Burrell alleged that 
he was detained from May, 2014 to September, 2014, even though he did not have the 
ability to keep up with his child support payments.   
 The District Court has yet to act on Burrell’s in forma pauperis motion and thus 
this civil action cannot proceed.  In his mandamus petition, he asks us to order the 
District Court to grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and direct the United 
States Marshal Service to serve his amended complaint on the defendants.  He asserts that 
his in forma pauperis motion has been pending for nearly 14 months.  He also noted that 
he filed a “Motion to Show Cause” on June 30, 2015, in which he called the delay to the 
District Court’s attention, see Docket Entry No. 26.  That motion also remains pending.  
For additional background, he referred us to his recent interlocutory appeal to this Court, 
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following the denial of his motion for a temporary restraining order, see C.A. No. 15-
1027. 
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See 
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify the use of this 
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must demonstrate that he has “no other adequate 
means to obtain [that] relief,” or that “the right to issuance [of the writ] is clear and 
indisputable.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 Under the in forma pauperis statute, a federal court may authorize the 
commencement of a civil action upon the assessment and payment of a partial payment of 
the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b)(1)-(2), after which “[t]he officers of the court shall 
issue and serve all process…., id. at § 1915(d).  However, notwithstanding an 
individual’s financial eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the 
case at any time if the court determines that -- * * * (B) the action or appeal -- (i) is 
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”  Id. at § 
1915(e)(2)(B).   
 In view of the statute’s grant of authority to the District Court to dismiss an in 
forma pauperis complaint without prejudice if proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 
Burrell has not demonstrated that he has a clear and indisputable right to a grant of his in 
forma pauperis motion and service of his amended complaint.  Federal courts usually 
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abstain from deciding civil actions such as his where state child support proceedings 
implicate important state interests, and the state proceedings provide an adequate 
opportunity to raise claims, see Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(discussing and applying Younger abstention doctrine). 
 Generally, the management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of 
the District Court, In re: Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), but 
a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Burrell’s in 
forma pauperis motion has been pending since he filed his civil action on September 29, 
2014, and this delay has the potential to offend due process.  See Johnson v. Rogers, 917 
F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (Court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month 
delay in adjudicating habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (District Court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand 
from appeals court denied petitioner due process).   Not all of the delay is, however, 
attributable to the District Court.  On December 23, 2014, Burrell filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order, which the District Court denied.  On December 31, 2014, 
Burrell took an interlocutory appeal to this Court, see C.A. No. 15-1027.  We ultimately 
dismissed his appeal on May 5, 2015 for lack of appellate jurisdiction, but the District 
Court reasonably refrained from acting on Burrell’s in forma pauperis motion during the 
pendency of this appeal in view of the fact that most appeals divest a District Court of its 
jurisdiction to act.  See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 We thus conclude that Burrell has not shown that he is currently entitled to 
mandamus relief based on undue delay.  We are concerned, however, that through his 
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June 30, 2015 “Motion to Show Cause,” he has done all that he can to alert the District 
Court to the delay in his case.  We recognize that no action has been taken in this case but 
we are confident the District Court will adjudicate the habeas petition within a reasonable 
time.  Therefore, we conclude that our intervention is not warranted at this time. 
